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A point repeatedly stressed by transaction cost economics is that the more speciﬁct h e
asset, the more likely is vertical integration to be optimal. In spite of the profusion of
empirical papers supporting this prediction, recent surveys and casual observation suggest
that higher levels of asset speciﬁcity need not always lead to vertical integration. The
purpose of this paper is to uncover some of the factors driving ﬁrms to (sometimes) choose
to remain separated, rather than integrate, in the presence of high speciﬁcity. Its main
economic message is that in a world where outside options matter and investments are
multidimensional, high levels of asset speciﬁcity can foster nonintegration: a low level of
speciﬁcity provides the most misdirected incentives when transacting in a market (because
the outside option of external trade becomes so tempting), thus making a stronger case for
nonintegration when speciﬁcity is high.
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sourcing1 Introduction
A point repeatedly stressed by transaction cost economics (TCE) is that the more speciﬁc
the asset, the more likely is vertical integration to be optimal.1 In spite of the profusion
of empirical papers supporting this basic TCE prediction (see the surveys by Macher and
Richman, 2008; Masten and Saussier, 2000; and Shelanski and Klein, 1995), recent surveys
and casual observation suggest that the relation between speciﬁcity and integration may not
be as straightforward as suggested in transaction cost theory — that is, higher levels of asset
speciﬁcity need not always lead to vertical integration.
The survey by Carter and Hodgson (2006), for example, shows that evidence is more
mixed than previously claimed; the one by David and Han (2004) reaches a similar conclusion
and highlights deﬁciencies in many existing empirical tests — most notably, that there is no
evidence on whether a given integration choice is eﬃcient, and that there are problems with
the operationalization and measurement of asset speciﬁcity. Woodruﬀ (2002) underlines
another potential problem: the empirical ﬁnding that speciﬁcity increases the beneﬁts of
integration is not enough to conclude that higher speciﬁcity will lead to more integration
— what happens to the cost of integration is also likely to be important, but is an issue
that has not been addressed by the existing empirical literature. Woodruﬀ’s analysis of
the Mexican footwear industry also suggests that TCE explanations may do a poor job
in predicting patterns of integration: when some product characteristics change (in the
direction of an increased level of speciﬁcity), the evidence indicates that integration becomes
less frequent.2 In addition, Holmström and Roberts (1998) point out many situations where
observed ownership patterns are hard to reconcile with transaction cost theory — such as
Japanese manufacturing, U.S. steel makers, airline alliances, and the contractual networks
in the media, software and biotechnology industries — and Gilson et al. (2009) extensively
document how rapidly innovating industries are moving away from integration to deal with
transaction-speciﬁc investments.
1The transaction cost approach developed from the work of Williamson (1975) and Klein et al. (1978).
Williamson (1985) provides a thorough discussion of the role of asset speciﬁcity in the integration decision.
2Check also Acemoglu et al. (2007), who show that TCE is not easily reconciled with some of their
ﬁndings about vertical integration in the UK manufacturing sector.
1The purpose of this paper is to uncover some of the factors driving ﬁrms to (sometimes)
choose to remain separated, rather than integrate, in the presence of high levels of asset
speciﬁcity. In the model considered, an upstream party uses an asset to produce in each
period a good that is valuable both to a downstream party and in an alternative use. As
in the property rights approach, asset ownership is the deﬁning characteristic of integration,
which will be identiﬁed with downstream ownership (and nonintegration with upstream
ownership).3 The asset is speciﬁc in the sense that the value of the good to the downstream
party is always larger that its value in the alternative use. The upstream party must make
multidimensional investments that aﬀect both these values of internal and external trade, but
contracts are incomplete: none of these investments or values can be put into an enforceable
contract.
Under integration, the downstream party can simply take the good without any payment
after production takes place. Under nonintegration, however, she has to pay a price to the
upstream party to secure the good. With incomplete contracts, ex post bargaining is needed
to determine this price and to allocate the surplus generated by the relationship. This paper
explores the role of outside options in bargaining in a relational contracting setting: each
bargainer gets half of the surplus unless this gives one of them strictly less than her outside
option (in which case she must receive her outside option, the other party receiving what is
left). Contrary to standard property rights theory (but similar to TCE), the paper shows
that the integration decision crucially depends on the level of asset speciﬁc i t y ,e v e ni nt h e
static version of the model. Contrary to TCE, however, it shows how, in a world where
outside options matter and investments are multidimensional, high levels of quasi-rents may
provide a rationale for nonintegration.
T h er o l eo ft h el e v e lo fs p e c i ﬁcity emerges naturally under bargaining with outside op-
tions: the bargained price of the good depends on whether or not the outside option is
binding, which in turn depends on how the outside option (i.e., the value of external trade)
is compared with value within the relationship. Put simply, the upstream party’s outside
option will not bind as long as the level of asset speciﬁcity is high enough. Thus the level of
3The property rights approach was pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990),
and is probably best presented in Hart’s (1995) book.
2asset speciﬁcity matters: it determines whether the upstream party’s threat to quit bargain-
ing and put the good to its alternative use is credible or not, and fundamentally aﬀects the
allocation of eﬀort across tasks and, in the dynamic setting, the temptations of either party
to renege on a given relational contract. This interplay between multitasking and outside
o p t i o n sl i e sb e n e a t ha l lo ft h er e s u l t si nt h i sp a p e r .
Regardless of the ownership arrangement, the downstream party would always like the
upstream party to take actions that increase the internal value of the good. With one-shot
interactions (spot contracting) the only instrument to provide incentives is asset ownership.
Giving ownership to the upstream party provides her with stronger incentives to work hard;
the allocation of this eﬀort, on the other hand, is determined by the price that results
from bargaining under nonintegration. Asset ownership must then strike a balance between
encouraging and directing the multidimensional actions taken by the investing (upstream)
party.4
With repeated interaction there is an additional instrument to provide and direct in-
centives under both ownership regimes: bonuses based on the value of the good. Because
bonuses are informal promises that must be self-enforcing, however, there are limits to what
can be credibly promised. Matters are more complex under such relational contracting since
the spot outcomes now form the punishments triggered by a defection, and both defec-
tion incentives (or reneging temptations) and punishment payoﬀsd e p e n do nt h eo w n e r s h i p
arrangement.
My main result is that under bargaining with outside options the ﬁr s tb e s ti se a s i e r
(harder) to achieve with relational nonintegration than with relational integration when the
degree of asset speciﬁcity is high (low). Hence, high levels of quasi-rents can provide a
rationale for nonintegration. The bonuses that deliver the ﬁrst-best outcome generate the
smallest (largest) temptation to renege on the relational contract under nonintegration when
asset speciﬁcity is high (low). This also implies that for some discount rates the ﬁrst best is
achievable under one ownership structure, but not under the other, depending on the level
of asset speciﬁcity.
That reputational forces can weaken the Williamsonian argument might not seem that
4Cf. also Holmström and Milgrom (1991), and Holmström and Tirole (1991).
3surprising — see Artz and Brush (2000), and Garvey (1995). What is more striking is that the
negative relationship between the level of speciﬁcity and vertical integration is present also in
the static model, where no reputational forces are at work.5 In the static case, nonintegration
always generates a larger joint surplus than integration when asset speciﬁcity is high. The
reason is simple. When the value of the good in the alternative use is much smaller than its
value within the relationship the outside option does not bind and hence does not aﬀect the
bargaining outcome. Giving ownership to the non-investing (downstream) party would then
only undermine the investment incentives of the investing (upstream) party. When asset
speciﬁcity is low, on the other hand, external trade becomes a tempting alternative and the
upstream party will in such situations favor actions that improve the alternative-use value
over actions that improve the value of internal trade. Integration can be valuable here to
control incentives because through integration the downstream party can prohibit external
trade.
More in line with basic TCE predictions, I show that under relational contracting: (i)
if asset speciﬁcity is high, large uncertainty over the value of internal trade favors (rela-
tional) integration over (relational) nonintegration; and (ii) if asset speciﬁcity is low, high
uncertainty over the value of external trade favors (relational) integration over (relational)
nonintegration. Speciﬁcity, when coupled with enough uncertainty about the supply price
(the price the downstream party should have to pay to secure the good under nonintegra-
tion), eventually leads to integration — this eliminates the supply price as a temptation to
either party for any level of asset speciﬁcity.
The next section presents the model in detail. In the following sections I take up the
discussion of the optimal governance structure and asset ownership under the alternative
bargaining environment in which the parties have outside options. I begin with the static
version of the model and then turn to relational contracts. Following Baker et al. (2002;
BGM hereinafter), we will refer to these two governance structures as ‘spot’ and ‘relational’,
and identify vertical integration with ‘employment’ and nonintegration with ‘outsourcing’.
Thus we will call ‘spot outsourcing’ the case in which the upstream party owns the asset
5This was not the case with the one asset-one investor version of Chiu’s (1998) static model, which
supports the basic TCE prediction that high speciﬁcity should lead to integration. See the discussion below.
4and no relational contract is feasible, and so on.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider the following setup, drawn from BGM. Two parties are engaged in a vertical rela-
tionship and can trade at dates t = 0,1,2...; for simplicity we will call them U (for upstream)
and D (for downstream). Both parties live forever, are risk-neutral, share the same interest
rate r per period, and have suﬃcient wealth to purchase ownership rights whenever this is
required.6 At each period t, U uses an (inﬁnitely-lived) asset to produce a good that is both
valuable to D (this value is Q) and in an alternative use (this value is P). The value of the
good always falls to zero at the end of the period during which it was produced. The asset
is speciﬁc in the sense that Q>P. Whoever owns the asset also owns the good.
We will consider a multitask environment: in each period the upstream party chooses a
vector of actions a ∈ <n
+ that stochastically aﬀects Q and P.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, Q and P
can take high values (indexed by H) or low values (indexed by L) satisfying QH >Q L >
PH >P L > 0, and the actions taken by the upstream party determine the probabilities of
achieving either outcome: QH (PH) is realized with probability q(a) (p(a)).7 These actions
are of course costly to the agent: the cost of actions a is given by c(a), which we will assume
increasing and strictly convex. Assume further that q(0)=p(0)=c(0)=0(taking no action
is costless, but gives no chance of achieving high values), where a = 0 can be interpreted as
a normalization for some minimum level of eﬀort exerted by U.
Actions are not observed by the downstream party. Outcomes (the realized values of Q
and P), on the other hand, are observable by both parties but nonveriﬁable (for instance,
by a court). Therefore, contracts based on a, Q or P cannot be enforced by a third party.
Under integration, D c a ns i m p l yt a k et h eg o o dw i t h o u ta n yp a y m e n tt oU once production
takes place. Under nonintegration, since Q>Pthere will be bargaining over the ownership
6We thus abstract from ﬁnancial considerations. On this, see Hansmann (1996). See also Aghion and
Tirole (1994) for an application to R&D where one party is cash constrained.
7Note that the crucial assumption here is that the asset is speciﬁc for every realization of Q and P;
hence the analysis can be generalized to any ﬁnite number of values, as in Baker et al. (2001), or to any
joint distribution function that assigns positive probability only to events involving Q>P.
5of the good.8 This will involve D paying U a (bargained) price ρ for the good. As we will
discuss shortly, results and predictions depend on how ρ is determined.
3 Spot governance structures
In this section we want to characterize equilibrium actions and payoﬀs under both spot gov-
ernance structures available: D-ownership or employment, and U-ownership or outsourcing.
In order to do so, we ﬁxi nt u r nt h et w oc h o i c e si nt h eﬁrst move of the game to integration
(employment) and nonintegration (outsourcing), and study the continuation games accord-
ing to the timing laid out in Figure 1. Since under nonintegration there is bargaining over
the ownership of the good, we also introduce the proposed bargaining protocol at this point.
Finally, we end the section by analyzing the optimal integration decision.9
Figure 1: The timing of the game
3.1 Spot employment
We begin by studying the case of integration under spot governance, what we have labeled
spot employment. The outcome is simple when the downstream party owns the asset: Since
no contract (formal or relational) is available the downstream party can simply take the good
8Since Q and P are observed by both parties, bargaining takes place under complete information and the
outcome is ex post eﬃcient. For a model with bargaining with private information and ex post ineﬃciencies,
see Matouschek (2004).
9We will not consider the case of joint ownership. Since under joint ownership the asset can be used only
by consent, in our simple setting it would amount to assuming that outside options are zero for both parties,
and results would be as in the case of high asset speciﬁcity (see below).
6and refuse to make any payment to the upstream party. In anticipation of this, the optimal
choice for the upstream party is to take no costly action, i.e., to choose a =( 0 ,0,...,0).T h e n
the value of the good to the downstream party is QL with probability 1. Let the superscript






Of course these values depend on neither the bargaining protocol nor the level of asset
speciﬁcity. When no contract is feasible, then the only means by which to provide incen-
tives for U is to give her the ownership of the asset. Since under nonintegration there is
bargaining over the price of the good, we turn to this matter before considering life under
spot outsourcing.
3.2 Bargaining rules
Since Q>P, under nonintegration there is bargaining over the ownership of the good after
production takes place. At this point, BGM follow the standard property rights theory
(whether static or dynamic) and use the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution, a solution that
assigns each party her disagreement payoﬀ plus half of the surplus created. We can think of
a situation where there is a spot market for the good in which U continues to trade at price
P while bargaining with D. With this bargaining solution, however, BGM’s results do not
depend on the level of asset speciﬁcity, i.e., they all hold as soon as Q − P, the aggregate
level of quasi-rents created by the investment, is positive — irrespective of how large that
diﬀerence is. This is unfortunate, for it does not allow us to rigorously investigate the kind
of Williamsonian assertions we are focusing on.
Consider instead a situation in which to sell the good to a diﬀerent downstream party
(or in a spot market) the upstream party must quit bargaining with the downstream party.
For instance, looking for a new partner might be time-consuming, or require some marketing
costs. By the time this is done, it may be too late for D to wait further for another good to
be produced. P then constitutes an outside option in the sense of Binmore, Rubinstein, and
Wolinsky (1986, p. 185). As is well known, when this outside option is always available each
7bargainer obtains half of the joint surplus, unless this gives one of them strictly less than
her outside option (in which case she must receive the latter, the other party receiving what
is left). This is what Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989) termed the “deal-me-out” rule, in
which the outside options are used only as constraints on the range of validity of the Nash
solution.10
Under the deal-me-out rule, we have that the payoﬀst oD and U (sD and sU)f r o m












(Qi − Pj,P j) if
Qi
2 ≤ Pj
Notice that since the downstream party’s outside option is zero, it can never bind. As
is clear from the expressions above (see also Proposition 6 in Binmore, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky, 1986), U’s outside option is relevant (it aﬀects the equilibrium outcome) only if it
constitutes a credible threat, i.e., if it binds. This alternative model of bargaining captures
the very natural phenomenon where a party keeps matching the other party’s outside oﬀers —
as in the case of the employer-employee relationship — and has received experimental support
(see Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1989).12 It is a natural way to model ex post bargaining
in Williamsonian hold-up contexts. The advantage of this bargaining model is that it allows
the level of asset speciﬁcity to aﬀect the optimal allocation of property rights.
With outside-options bargaining, the bargained price ρ of the good depends on realized






2 if ASij >P j
Pj otherwise
10Compare this to the standard Nash bargaining solution, in which U’s option to put the good to its
alternative use is simply taken as shifting the disagreement point from (0,0) to (0,P) in the Nash product.
This solution assigns each party her disagreement payoﬀ plus half of the surplus generated by the agreement,
an outcome that has been termed ‘split-the-diﬀerence’ in the literature. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1986) discuss extensively the application of the Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.
11In what follows, Q and P will make reference to the random variables, whereas Qi and Pj will denote
realizations of these variables.
12See also the discussion in Chiu (1998).
8The upstream party’s outside option will not bind as long as ASij >P j.P u t d i ﬀerently,
which price arises depends on whether the level of asset speciﬁcity is greater or less than a
threshold given by the alternative-use value of the good.
3.3 Spot outsourcing
We now consider matters under nonintegration, i.e., when the upstream party owns the asset.
Whatever the bargaining environment, U will take the expected outcome of the process into
account when choosing her actions. Denote E [ρ] the expected price of the good. Let the
superscript SO stand for spot outsourcing. Then the payoﬀ to the upstream party is given
by
U
SO =m a x
a E [ρ] − c(a)=E
£




whereas the downstream party’s payoﬀ is DSO = E
£
Q − ρ | a = aSO¤
,w h e r eaSO ∈ argmax
a










Note that the expression for ρ depends on the realization of AS (and hence on those of Q
and P). The upstream party, however, chooses a before Q and P are observed. Call the case
in which ASij >P j a situation of (relatively) ‘high asset speciﬁcity’, and the case ASij <P j a
situation of (relatively) ‘low asset speciﬁcity’. For U to know which bargaining environment
will prevail (high or low speciﬁcity) when choosing a, we will assume that parameter values
are such that we are always on one side of the threshold or the other — that is, we will make
two mutually exclusive assumptions, namely,
Ah : QL > 2PH (high speciﬁcity)
and
Al : QH < 2PL (low speciﬁcity)
and perform the analysis under each of those alternatively to see how results are modiﬁed.
These assumptions allow us to focus on the two extreme cases in the most simple setting,
and to isolate the eﬀects of the degree of asset speciﬁcity on the integration decision.
9Under Ah, U’s outside option will never bind whatever the realizations of Q and P; i.e.,
we will always be in a situation of high speciﬁcity (hence we will index all variables by the
superscript h). When the alternative assumption Al holds, the upstream party’s outside
option will always bind, and therefore low asset speciﬁcity (superscript l) will prevail. The








l = Pj. (2)
Notice that here, contrary to BGM, even under nonintegration P may play no role (speciﬁ-
cally, when asset speciﬁcity is high).
3.4 The integration decision
The comparison between the two ownership structures is straightforward. Let ∆Q = QH −










Spot employment can only dominate spot outsourcing when providing incentives to the











I n c e n t i v e sw i l ln o tb ep r o v i d e d( b yg i v i n go w n e r s h i pt oU) whenever the cost of extracting
eﬀort from the upstream party is larger than the beneﬁt of doing so (i.e., achieving a higher
outcome with a higher probability). This could happen, for instance, if in order to improve
her bargaining position the upstream party takes actions to increase the alternative-use value
of the good at the expense of the value to the downstream party.
To gain more insight into the optimality of each regime we will place more structure
on the model. Following BGM, we will assume U takes two actions that aﬀect linearly the
10probabilities of obtaining high values, and that impose quadratic costs on her. Formally,














where q1,q 2,p 1,p 2 ≥ 0 and q1p2 6= q2p1. It is now easy to show the following. (For ease
of exposition the proofs and more formal statements of this and all other results will be
relegated to the Appendix.)
Proposition 1 Under spot governance:
(i) If asset speciﬁcity is high, integration is always dominated by nonintegration.
(ii) If asset speciﬁcity is low, both a small variability in the value of the good to the down-
stream party and a large variability in the alternative-use value of the good favor integration
over nonintegration.
In the static case, when asset speciﬁcity is high integration always yields a smaller joint
surplus than nonintegration. A potential drawback with outsourcing is that improving the
alternative-use value P of the good may draw excessive attention from the upstream party.
The upside of integration is that it eliminates P as a temptation. When the outside option is
not binding, however, P is already irrelevant (i.e., it has no eﬀect on the bargaining outcome),
and integration loses most of its appeal: it would just mean giving the asset to the party who
does not make relationship-speciﬁc investments, hence reducing the investment incentives of
the upstream party.
Spot employment can only dominate spot outsourcing when asset speciﬁcity is low. In
that case the upstream party’s outside option is high ex post (i.e., it binds) with outsourcing,
and therefore her ex ante incentives will be driven by the eﬀects of actions on her outside
option, rather than on the value of the good to the downstream party. The drawback with
employment is that it may cause excessive hold-up: spot employment is associated with full
hold-up of U by D, and therefore generates zero ex ante incentives. Nonintegration provides
incentives for costly actions, but in our multitasking setup these are driven by ∆P = PH−PL,
11the return on investments on the alternative-use value of the good, when asset speciﬁcity is
low (see the Appendix). A large variability in the alternative-use value of the good, that is,
al a r g e∆P, implies that incentives for the wrong actions are powerful, and hence integration
becomes a superior governance structure by eliminating incentives altogether.
A ss h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i x ,a ni n c r e a s ei n∆Q, the variability in the value of the good
to the downstream party, does not aﬀect actions when asset speciﬁcity is low. On the other
hand, it increases the left-hand side of (3) above, thus making the optimality of integration
less likely. Integration can only be the eﬃcient governance mode when this variability is
small enough, as Proposition 1(ii) remarks.13
Asset ownership always motivates U here, as in Hart (1995), even with outside op-
tions. This has to be contrasted with De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that asset
monotonicity of investment does not necessarily hold with outside options. In their setup,
if giving ownership to the noninvestor makes her outside option bind, the investing party is
made residual claimant of her investment, and thus has better investment incentives. Their
mechanism does not work here, however: given our assumptions, D’s outside option can
never bind. This does not imply that the investor should always own the asset. On the
contrary, Proposition 1 identiﬁes circumstances in which it is optimal to give ownership to
the noninvestor, and should be contrasted with Proposition 2 in Hart and Moore (1990, p.
1131), which says that whenever only one agent can invest, she should own the asset. Of
course the key to our diﬀerent predictions is multitasking.14
According to Proposition 1 there is a sense in which an increase in asset speciﬁcity leads to
less integration: we can always ﬁnd ∆P and ∆Q such that spot employment dominates spot
outsourcing under low asset speciﬁcity, whereas going to a situation of high asset speciﬁcity
would shift the eﬃcient organizational form from integration to nonintegration. Moreover,
given the ﬁrst part of the proposition there is no way that an increase in speciﬁcity can
change the eﬃcient governance structure from outsourcing to employment.
The results in this section are inﬂuenced by the fact that the lack of a relational contract
13Another way to think of the results in part (ii) of Proposition 1 is that spot employment can dominate
spot outsourcing only if there is overinvestment under nonintegration (i.e., if ∆P À ∆Q).
14See Cai (2003) for related results. Chiu (1998) identiﬁes other circumstances in which ownership by the
noninvesting party is the most eﬃcient arrangement, even with unidimensional investments.
12precludes the use of bonuses to provide incentives; asset ownership is then the only remaining
means. How these conclusions are aﬀected when relational contracts are available will be
the focus of the following section, where we analyze repeated-game versions of the model
presented in section 2.
4 Governance under relational contracts
Regardless of the ownership arrangement, the downstream party always wants the upstream
party to take actions that increase Q. Ongoing interaction may provide an instrument for
providing eﬀective incentives which is not available in the static framework of section 3: the
downstream party may be able to make a self-enforcing promise to pay a bonus whenever
a high value is achieved. This kind of implicit arrangement constitutes the essence of a
relational contract.
Note that a relational contract (if feasible) can never be worse than spot relationships.
The parties can always play the static Nash equilibrium of the game, and this constitutes a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in our supergame. In this section, we will thus see if and
how asset ownership aﬀects the feasibility of the superior relational contract. We will assume
that the parties can trade at dates t = 0, 1, 2, ... according to the stage game depicted in
ﬁgure 2.
Figure 2: Timing with relational contracts
In general terms, compensation in a relational contract consists of a ﬁxed payment
(salary) st and a contingent payment bt : Φ → <,w h e r eΦ is the set of all possible re-
13alizations of the performance outcome observed by both parties, ϕt = {Qt,P t}.I np r i n c i p l e ,
promised compensation can depend on the whole history of the relationship, and the re-
lational contract can be quite messy; to characterize optimal relational contracts in this
context, nevertheless, it suﬃces to look at stationary contracts, in which the downstream
party promises the same compensation scheme in every period.15
Formally, total compensation in any period t is given by Wt = s + b(ϕt), and the
d i s c r e t i o n a r yp a y m e n t si ne a c hp e r i o do n l yd e p e n do nt h ep e r f o r m a n c eo u t c o m ei nt h es a m e
period. Within our simple setting, the relational compensation contract can be best described
as (s,{bij})=( s,bHH,b HL,b LH,b LL),w h e r et h es a l a r ys is paid by the downstream party
to the upstream party at the beginning of each period and bij is supposed to be paid when
Q = Qi and P = Pj,f o ri,j = H, L. In analyzing self-enforcing relational contracts, we
can concentrate on contracts that maximize the joint surplus of the relationship (subject to
self-enforceability), since the ﬁxed compensation in the initial period of the contract can be
adjusted to redistribute surplus without aﬀecting underlying incentives.16
If U accepts the relational contract oﬀered by D,h e rp e r i o dp a y o ﬀ will be
U
R =m a x
a s + bHHq(a)p(a)+bHLq(a)(1 − p(a)) + bLH(1 − q(a))p(a)+
+bLL(1 − q(a))(1 − p(a)) − c(a)=E
£




where aR ∈ argmax
a
E [s + b] − c(a).17 The downstream party’s payoﬀ is given by DR =
E
£
Q − s − b | a = aR¤










A given relational contract will induce the same actions by the upstream party and
thus produce the same surplus, irrespective of asset ownership, as long as the contract
satisﬁes the corresponding feasibility constraint (which we analyze below). Since changing
the bargaining environment changes the outcome of the process (the bargained price), this
change in outcome may also change the parties’ temptations to renege on the relational
15See Theorem 2 in Levin (2003, p. 840).
16See Theorem 1 in Levin (2003, p. 840).
17Results would not change if U were to oﬀer a contract to D.
14contract, and hence aﬀect the feasibility of a contract. Therefore, a crucial part in what
follows will be to compute the payoﬀs after reneging, what we do in the next subsections.
We will analyze trigger-strategy equilibria in which after a deviation from the relational
compensation contract (s,{bij}) the parties revert to the static equilibrium of the game
forever — i.e., the party who did not renege refuses to enter into any new relational contract
with the other party, and the relationship goes on under spot governance. Although generally
trigger strategies are suboptimal (in the sense of Abreu, 1986, 1988), and not robust to ex
post renegotiation, trembles and mistakes, they are simple and not that unrealistic. Since the
main point of the paper is about bargaining rules, not strategies, I oﬀer no further defense
of this equilibrium concept here. The interested reader is referred to the papers by Blonski
and Spagnolo (2003) and Kvaløy (2007) for a discussion of strategies within the setting of
BGM.
We will also allow parties to negotiate to an eﬃcient asset ownership arrangement after
reneging. For example, under relational employment we will have spot employment when it
is more eﬃcient for D to retain ownership of the asset (SSE >S SO), and we will have spot
outsourcing when it is more eﬃcient for U to buy it from D at some price π (SSO >S SE)—
which she can always do given the suﬃcient wealth assumption.
4.1 Reneging temptations under relational employment
Let us begin the analysis of the parties’ temptations to renege on the relational contract
by looking at the case in which the downstream party owns the asset. In this situation
of relational employment, D can refuse to pay the promised bonus once Qi and Pj are
realized, and simply take the good without paying anything since she owns the asset. After
reneging, and given our assumptions, she either retains ownership of the good and earns
DSE in perpetuity, or sells the asset to U at price π and receives DSO in perpetuity. On the
contrary, if the downstream party honors the contract, she pays bij and continues with the
relationship, thus making proﬁt DRE each period in perpetuity. It follows that D will stick




















SO + π if S
SO >S
SE. (6)
The upstream party can renege on the relational contract by refusing to accept a promised
payment bij (or to make a promised payment if bij < 0). After that, she earns USE per period
for ever if she does not buy the asset, and she pays the price π and obtains USO in perpetuity
if she buys the asset from D. On the other hand, if U honors the contract, she receives bij
and continues with the relationship, thus making proﬁt URE each period in perpetuity. It




















SO − π if S
SO >S
SE. (8)
The present value of honoring the contract for D (U) should exceed the present value
of reneging for every value of bij, i.e., equations (5) and (6) ((7) and (8)) must hold for the
maximum (minimum) value of the promised bonus. This is true both when SSE >S SO and
when SSO >S SE. We can combine these extreme versions of the reneging constraints into a
single necessary and suﬃcient condition for a self-enforcing relational-employment contract
(see BGM, p. 52, and Levin, 2003, Theorem 3, p. 842):











The feasibility constraint (9) says that the variation in contingent compensation has a
limit given by the net future gains from the relationship. This condition is what Levin
(2003) called the dynamic enforcement constraint. The left-hand side of the inequality is
the maximum total temptation to renege on the relational-employment contract (i.e. the
sum of both parties’ temptations), whereas the right-hand side is the present value of net




). The eﬃcient relational-employment contract maximizes the total surplus
SRE in equation (4) subject to the dynamic enforcement constraint (9).18
18Note that the value of SSO will depend on the working assumption about the prevailing bargaining
164.2 Reneging temptations under relational outsourcing
Let us now turn to the analysis of the feasibility of relational contracts under nonintegration.
When U owns the asset the comparison between the promised payment and the price that
would result from bargaining under spot outsourcing determines each party’s temptations to
renege on the relational-outsourcing contract. In particular, if the promised bonus bij exceeds
the bargained price ρ (where ρ = ρh or ρl depending on the level of asset speciﬁcity, as in
equations (1) and (2)), the downstream party would be better oﬀ this period by reneging on
the relational contract. Conversely, if bij falls short of ρ, it is the upstream party who would
be better oﬀ by reneging. Proceeding as with relational employment, we can show that a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the relational-outsourcing contract to be self-enforcing
is











As in (9), the left-hand side is the maximum total reneging temptation, and the right-
hand side is the present value of the net total surplus. The eﬃcient relational-outsourcing
contract maximizes the total surplus SRO in equation (4) subject to this dynamic enforcement

























h,( 1 1 )
or












l,( 1 2 )
i.e., when asset speciﬁcity is high and low. In BGM, “a key diﬀerence between relational con-
tracts under outsourcing versus under employment is that the good’s value in its alternative
use, P,a ﬀects the reneging decision under relational outsourcing but not under relational
employment”. As can readily be seen from (11), with deal-me-out bargaining this is not true
for high levels of asset speciﬁcity. Similarly, Q (the value of the good to the downstream
party) does not appear on the left-hand side of the reneging constraint (12).
environment (i.e., Ah or Al). We do not make this dependence explicit here in order to avoid additional
subindices that would distract from the main point.
175 The boundaries of the ﬁrm
Having now discussed the parties’ temptations to renege on a relational contract under both
governance structures, we can proceed to their comparison. By simple inspection of the feasi-
bility constraints (9), (11), and (12), it becomes clear that for any level of asset speciﬁcity the
parties’ temptations to renege on a relational contract depend on the governance structure.
Hence, asset ownership aﬀects the feasibility of a given relational contract.19 This conﬁrms
the main insight in BGM (p. 56) and extends it to a diﬀerent bargaining environment and
to diﬀerent levels of asset speciﬁcity.
To derive some further implications of the model we have just outlined, let us use the
speciﬁc functional forms introduced in Section 3.4. Assume also that the bonus payments
bij take the speciﬁcf o r mbij = bi + βj (i,j = H,L). Furthermore, let ∆b = bH − bL and
∆β = βH − βL. The expected bonus can be written as bLL + q(a)∆b + p(a)∆β, and thus
we can interpret the assumed functional form as saying that the downstream party promises
bL + βL regardless of the outcomes and additional bonuses ∆b if Q = QH (which occurs
with probability q(a))a n d∆β if P = PH (which happens with probability p(a)), without
any further payment (for example, if both Q and P achieve their highest values). For later
reference, we will label ∆b ‘Q-based incentives’, and refer to ∆β as ‘P-based incentives’.
Analyzing the special form taken now by the reneging constraints presented in Section
4 will allow us to derive some additional results. Under relational employment the self-
enforcement constraint (9) writes as (see Appendix 1 in BGM)












where k = h,l depending on the working assumption, Ah or Al. Recall that ∆Q = QH −QL
and ∆P = PH − PL. Under relational outsourcing with outside options, we can show (see
the Appendix) that the necessary and suﬃcient conditions (11) and (12) for the relational-
outsourcing contract to be self-enforcing can be written as follows:
















h,( 1 1 ’ )
19Asset ownership is not the only means to aﬀect reneging temptations. Multimarket contact (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1990) and social relations (Spagnolo, 1999) may be relevant factors also, just to mention a
couple.
18i.e., if asset speciﬁcity is high; and












l,( 1 2 ’ )
i.e., if asset speciﬁcity is low.
We can now show how higher levels of asset speciﬁcity can make the optimality of non-
integration more likely, that is, how high levels of quasi-rents may provide a rationale for
nonintegration.
Proposition 2 Under bargaining with outside options, the ﬁr s tb e s ti se a s i e r( h a r d e r )t o
achieve with a relational-outsourcing contract than with relational employment when the
degree of asset speciﬁcity is high (low).
The ﬁr s tb e s ta c t i o n sa r et h o s ew h i c hm a x i m i z et h ej o i n ts u r p l u sE [Q] − c(a).I ti sn o t
hard to guess (see the Appendix) that achieving the ﬁrst-best outcome requires providing only
Q-based incentives (and no bonuses based on P), that is, ∆b>0 and ∆β =0 .P r o p o s i t i o n2
claims that these bonuses that deliver the ﬁrst-best outcome generate the smallest (largest)
temptation to renege on the relational contract under nonintegration when asset speciﬁcity is
high (low). The presence of multitasking and outside options is once again key to understand
this result, which might look counterintuitive at ﬁr s t( T C E )g l a n c e .
For given ﬁrst-best bonuses, the reneging temptation of the downstream party is always
lower under relational outsourcing because only the amount above the bargained price can be
saved through defection, whereas under relational employment the full bonus can be saved.
Nonintegration, however, creates a temptation for the upstream party when the realized
value of internal trade is low, because she does not receive the bonus ∆b in this case, but
can obtain something through bargaining by defecting. When asset speciﬁcity is high, U’s
increased reneging temptation is more than compensated by the reduction in D’s defection
incentives: high speciﬁcity means that the outside option does not bind and that external
trade is not a tempting option; P becomes irrelevant and U’s attention is not diverted by the
value of external trade. Hence the total temptation to renege on the ﬁrst-best, relational-
outsourcing contract is lower when the parties remain nonintegrated in situations of high
asset speciﬁcity.
19When speciﬁcity is low, on the other hand, the realization of P matters: the upstream
party has incentives to improve the alternative-use value in order to improve her bargain-
ing position, even though achieving ﬁrst best calls for zero incentives on P. T h eu p s i d eo f
i n t e g r a t i o ni st h a ti te l i m i n a t e se x t e r n a lt r a d ea sa no p t i o n .I ti st r u et h a tt h ed o w n s t r e a m
party has a larger temptation to renege under integration, but this is overcome by the elim-
ination of U’s reneging temptation, so that the total temptation to renege on the ﬁrst-best,
relational-employment contract is lower under integration when asset speciﬁcity is low.
In a sense the goals of both parties are best aligned in the case of a nonbinding outside
option, but they are most conﬂictive when the outside option binds. As we have already
discussed, the outside option does not bind when asset speciﬁcity is high, and the realization
of P is thus irrelevant under both ownership regimes: the ﬁrst-best, P-based bonus is zero
and the bargained price does not depend on the alternative-use value. The upstream party
may be more committed to enhancing the value of the relationship (that is, Q)w h e ns h e
has few alternative opportunities in case the relationship breaks up (when P is low relative
to Q, and thus the outside option does not bind).20
Proposition 2 is the main result of the paper: it focuses on the level of asset speciﬁcity and
gives interestingly the opposite prediction to transaction cost economics — especially if com-
bined with Proposition 1, which showed that, with one-shot relationships, integration could
only be eﬃcient in a situation of low asset speciﬁcity. These results oﬀer theoretical support
to the casual observation that in “[m]any of the hybrid organizations that are emerging,
[...] high degrees of frequency and mutual dependency seem to support, rather than hinder,
ongoing cooperation across ﬁrm boundaries” (Holmström and Roberts, 1998, p. 92). The
most cited example of this sort concerns the relations between Japanese car manufacturers
and their suppliers (Cusumano, 1985; Dyer, 1996; Womack et al., 1990). Holmström and
Roberts (1998) go so far as to argue that the “Japanese [procurement and subcontracting]
pattern is directly at odds with transaction cost theory” (see also the ﬁndings in Dyer, 1996,
p. 650). Consider in addition the evidence in Anderson et al. (2000) who document that,
under relational contracting, “factors that previous studies found to favor insourcing now
favor outsourcing” in U.S. automakers — most importantly, that the greater the complexity
20See De Meza and Lockwood (1998) for a related claim.
20of the product (a proxy for speciﬁcity), the greater the likelihood of outsourcing.21
The following results are more in line with Williamsonian predictions.
Proposition 3 Under relational contracting:
(i) If asset speciﬁcity is high, a large variability in the value of the good to the downstream
party favors (relational) integration over (relational) nonintegration.
(ii) If asset speciﬁcity is low, a large variability in the alternative-use value of the good
favors (relational) integration over (relational) nonintegration.
When the upstream party owns the asset, she has the right to put the good to an
alternative use, and hence the bargained price of the good ρ has a clear bearing on the
temptations to renege on a given relational-outsourcing contract: if the promised bonus falls
short of ρ the upstream party would be better-oﬀ this period by defecting; if the negotiated
price is less than the promised payment, it is the downstream party who would have an
incentive to renege. In a situation of high asset speciﬁcity, ρ = Qi/2 and large uncertainty
on Q implies a large variability of the price the downstream party would have to pay to
secure the good under nonintegration. Similarly, when asset speciﬁcity is low, ρ = Pj and
uncertainty on P translates one for one into uncertainty on the supply price.
N o wn o t i c et h a te q u a t i o n s( 1 1 ’ )a n d( 1 2 ’ )s u g g e s tt h a t( i )t o ol a r g eav a r i a t i o ni nt h e
value of the good to D under high speciﬁcity, and (ii) too large a variation in the alternative-
use value under low speciﬁcity, would render relational outsourcing infeasible because the
total temptation to renege would be too high. This is not the case with integration: the
feasibility constraint on relational-employment contracts (9’) does not depend on ∆Q nor
∆P.P r o p o s i t i o n3c o n ﬁrms this intuition. The result has a TCE ﬂavor: Speciﬁcity, when
coupled with enough uncertainty (about the supply price ρ), eventually leads to (relational)
integration — vertical integration eliminates the supply price as a temptation to either party
for any level of asset speciﬁcity.22
When coupled with Proposition 1(ii), Proposition 3(ii) has a straightforward implication:
21Mol (2005) ﬁnds a similar pattern in the Dutch manufacturing sector.
22The availability of relational contracts implicitly assumes that r is low enough.
21Corollary 1 Ownership by the downstream party is eﬃcient when asset speciﬁcity is low
and uncertainty on the alternative-use value of the good is high.
Uncertainty on P favors integration when asset speciﬁcity is low: either spot employment
or relational employment will generate the largest joint surplus. The corollary thus provides
aq u a l i ﬁcation of Result 1 in BGM (p. 76), which says that vertical integration is the eﬃcient
governance structure when ∆P is large, by stating the condition under which it is more likely
to be true (namely, low asset speciﬁcity).
6 Concluding remarks
The main economic message of this paper is that in a world where outside options matter and
investments are multidimensional, high levels of asset speciﬁcity can foster nonintegration.
Thus, the paper provides a rationale for the pattern of new organizational forms that we
are seeing, which are “characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, frequency and asset
speciﬁcity”, and yet “do not lead to integration” (Holmström and Roberts, 1998, p. 92) —
a pattern that has proved hard to explain with traditional transaction cost economics. As
in Gibbons (2005, p. 207), “parties choose to transact in ﬁrms precisely when transacting
in a market would produce misdirected incentives”; here, it is a low level of asset speciﬁcity
that provides the most misdirected incentives (because the outside option of external trade
becomes so tempting), thus making a stronger case for nonintegration when speciﬁcity is
high.
Holmström and Roberts (1998, p. 92) contend that “[t]he property rights approach,
with its emphasis on incentives driven by ownership, may be a good starting point for
investigating these new hybrid structures”. As is well known, however, marginal, not total,
returns determine investments in the property rights theory of the ﬁrm. For this reason the
level of asset speciﬁcity has no bearing on the make-or-buy decision.23 In this paper, I provide
a simple and straightforward way of incorporating these diﬀerent levels of asset speciﬁcity
in a dynamic, relational contracting model of the ﬁrm in the spirit of the property rights
approach, and show that these levels matter even in the static version of the model. The role
23See, for instance, Holmström (1999) and Whinston (2003).
22of the level of speciﬁcity emerges naturally once I drop the standard Nash bargaining solution
widely used in the property rights theory, and consider instead an alternative situation in
which to take up an outside option one party must quit bargaining with the other party.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the ﬁrst to explore the eﬀects of outside options
bargaining in dynamic property rights models.24 I am not, nevertheless, the ﬁrst to show
that the level of asset speciﬁcity can matter in the property rights approach. Chiu (1998)
and De Meza and Lockwood (1998) have already introduced bargaining with outside options
in static property rights models, and have shown that some of their basic lessons can be
reversed. Even though they do not emphasize it explicitly, it is not hard to see that under
the outside option principle the level of speciﬁcity matters for the optimal ownership structure
in their work.
The way in which it matters, however, is diﬀerent. Given their assumptions, for any
ownership structure, equilibrium investment levels are less than their ﬁrst-best levels, which
implies that the optimal ownership structure is the one that maximizes investment. The level
of asset speciﬁcity determines whether this is achieved by giving or taking away ownership
from the investor. Taking ownership away can foster investment if it makes the investor
residual claimant, which happens when the noninvestor’s outside option binds. In my paper
the noninvesting party’s outside option never binds. With multidimensional investments
the level of asset speciﬁcity directs the allocation of investment eﬀorts through the investor’s
outside option, and muted incentives can be optimal. Besides, Chiu (1998) and De Meza and
Lockwood (1998) do not provide clean arguments for which way the relationship between
speciﬁcity and integration goes and why, and it is not hard to see that in the one asset-one
investor version of Chiu’s model high levels of speciﬁcity favor integration, as in TCE.
Here I have moved from a static to a relational world, which is arguably a better de-
scription of the real world (see BGM), to analyze the role of the level of asset speciﬁcity.
In contemporaneous work, Kvaløy (2007) also makes the level of asset speciﬁcity matter
in a BGM-like framework and again questions the central hypothesis of transaction cost
economics about speciﬁcity and integration. He achieves this through a diﬀerent approach,
24Other papers that investigate alternative bargaining protocols in diﬀerent dynamic hold-up settings are
Che and Sakovics (2007), and Evans (2008).
23however, as his work maintains BGM’s 50:50 Nash bargaining solution, and assumes instead
that the parties refuse to trade with each other in the punishment phase (similar to Klein
and Leﬄer, 1981).
Throughout the analysis, I have taken the level of asset speciﬁcity to be exogenous. While
this is in line with virtually every empirical study of the TCE, asset speciﬁcity is often a choice
variable, and endogenizing it would be an interesting avenue for future research. Ellman
(2006) discusses why ﬁrms would intentionally choose to increase speciﬁcity, and though
the issue of the boundaries of the ﬁrm does not appear formally in his model, the author
discusses how organizational design (integration) could be chosen to foster this speciﬁcity.
In my paper, joint ownership (e.g. a joint venture) can be used when asset speciﬁcity is low
to replicate the results under high speciﬁcity without integrating.25 This choice can make
the outside option of the investor non-binding (thus providing him with better investment
incentives) and increase the parties’ joint surplus.26
Appendix
A.1 Proof of inequalities (11’) and (12’)
This proof parallels that in Appendix 1 in BGM. Let Z = bL+βL−1
2QL and W = bL+βL−PL.













. For every pair of realizations of Q and P,w e
have
(HH) bHH − 1
2QH = bH + βH − 1
2QH = ∆b − 1
2∆Q + ∆β + Z
(HL) bHL − 1
2QH = bH + βL − 1
2QH = ∆b − 1
2∆Q + Z
(LH) bLH − 1
2QL = bL + βH − 1
2QL = ∆β + Z
(LL) bLL − 1
2QL = bL + βL − 1
2QL = Z
25See also Rajan and Zingales (1998).
26Halonen (2002) argues that mutual dependency through joint ownership (by removing the investor’s
outside option) can make the ﬁrst best easier to achieve when the parties are very important to each other,
which is reminiscent of my Proposition 2.
24Let max(•) and min(•) denote the maximum and minimum of the expressions above.
There are four cases to consider:
1. ∆b− 1
2∆Q>0, ∆β>0. Then, max(•)=(HH) and min(•)=(LL), and the reneging
temptation is ∆b − 1
2∆Q + ∆β.
2. ∆b− 1
2∆Q>0, ∆β<0. Then, max(•)=(HL) and min(•)=(LH), and the reneging
temptation is ∆b − 1
2∆Q − ∆β.
3. ∆b− 1















These four cases can be subsumed in a single expression for the reneging temptation,
¯ ¯∆b − 1
2∆Q
¯ ¯+|∆β|, which yields (11’). When Al holds the left hand side of (10) is max(bij − Pj)−
min(bij − Pj). For every pair of realizations of Q and P,w en o wh a v e
(HH) bHH − PH = bH + βH − PH = ∆b + ∆β − ∆P + W
(HL) bHL − PL = bH + βL − PL = ∆b + W
(LH) bLH − PH = bL + βH − PH = ∆β − ∆P + W
(LL) bLL − PL = bL + βL − PL = W
We can now proceed as in the high speciﬁcity case by replacing ∆b− 1
2∆Q by ∆b and ∆β
by ∆β − ∆P, to obtain a single expression for the reneging temptation, |∆b| + |∆β − ∆P|,
which yields (12’) and completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let ∆Q = QH − QL and ∆P = PH − PL. The parties’ payoﬀsa n dt h et o t a ls u r p l u si ne a c h



































25in a situation of high speciﬁcity (i.e., under Ah), and
U
SO




























i nt h ec a s eo fl o ws p e c i ﬁcity (i.e., under Al). The optimal actions taken by the upstream



















The joint surpluses above can thus be written as
S
SO












































As in Section 3, aSE
1 = aSE
2 =0and SSE = QL.
F o r m a l l y ,w h a tw en e e dt os h o wt op r o v et h eﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o p o s i t i o ni st h a t ,f o r
given values of q1,p 1,q 2,p 2,i fAh holds then SSE <S SO
h for all ∆P and all ∆Q. This follows
trivially from the comparison of equation (A1) and SSE = QL. To prove the second part
of the proposition is tantamount to proving that, for given values of q1,p 1,q 2,p 2,i fAl holds
then:
• there exists ∆Pl such that for all ∆P>∆Pl we have SSE >S SO
l ,a n d
• there exists ∆Ql such that if ∆Q>∆Ql then SSO
l >S SE.
26If Al holds and ∆P ∈ (0,P L),27 by direct comparison of SSE and SSO
l in equation (A2),
SSE >S SO




2 ∆Q,w h i c hp r o v e st h eﬁrst point. Next
consider the case of ∆Q. Under Al the diﬀerence SSO
l −SSE is increasing and linear in ∆Q.
Hence it will be positive for any ∆Q>∆Ql ≡ (p2
1+p2
2)∆P
2(q1p1+q2p2) (as long as ∆Q<2PL − QL to
satisfy Al).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The ﬁrst best actions are those which maximize the joint surplus E [Q] − c(a).U n d e rt h e
assumed functional forms these are the solution to
max
a1,a2































Under a relational contract the upstream party chooses actions to maximize











Her optimal choices are given by
a
R
1 = q1∆b + p1∆β,
a
R
2 = q2∆b + p2∆β.
Clearly, we can only have the ﬁrst best outcome under a relational contract if ∆b = ∆Q>0
and ∆β =0 , as long as the relevant feasibility constraint is satisﬁed by this particular
relational compensation contract, namely







,k= h,l, under relational employment;









, under relational outsourcing and Ah;a n d







, under relational outsourcing and Al.
The proof follows from direct inspection of these inequalities above.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the ﬁrst part of this result, we need to show that relational outsourcing becomes
impossible for suﬃciently large ∆Q when asset speciﬁcity is high. Formally, for given
q1,p 1,q 2,p 2,∆P,i fAh holds then there exists ∆Q∗
h such that for all ∆Q>∆Q∗
h,r e l a -
tional outsourcing is impossible — i.e., condition (11’) fails. We will proceed in two steps to
prove this:
Step 1. Too strong an incentive based on the value of the good to the downstream
party makes relational outsourcing inferior to spot outsourcing, i.e., given q1,p 1,q 2,p 2,∆P,
there exists ∆b0 such that, for any ∆β,i f∆b>∆b0 then SRO − SSO
h < 0 (SSO
h stands for
the joint surplus under spot outsourcing when speciﬁcity is high, and SRO for the surplus
under relational outsourcing). The diﬀerence between SRO and SSO
h , seen as a function
of ∆b, is a concave function. Hence, it will be negative for suﬃciently large ∆b, i.e. for
















Step 2.C h o o s e∆Q∗
h such that 1
2∆Q∗






,w h e r eSFB ≡ maxE [Q]−
c(a) stands for ﬁrst-best surplus. If ∆b>∆b0 we have from step 1 that SRO−SSO





< 0, and the necessary and suﬃcient condition for any relational-
outsourcing contract to be self-enforcing fails (since the left-hand side is always positive,
and we have shown that the right-hand side is negative). If ∆b ≤ ∆b0, on the other hand,
we have that 1
2∆Q∗
h > ∆b,s ot h eﬁrst term on the left-hand side of the feasibility con-
straint (11’) is at least 1
2∆Q∗
h − ∆b ≥ 1
2∆Q∗




















, so once again the necessary and suﬃcient condition fails. There-
f o r e ,w eh a v et h a tt o ol a r g eav a r i a t i o ni nt h ev a lue to the downstream party makes relational
outsourcing infeasible.
28T op r o v et h es e c o n dp a r to ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n ,i ts u ﬃces to show that relational outsourcing
is not feasible when asset speciﬁcity is low and ∆P is large enough. Formally, for given values
of q1,p 1,q 2,p 2,r,∆Q,i fAl holds and ∆P ∈ (0,P L),28 then there exists ∆P0
l such that for
all ∆P>∆P0
l the feasibility constraint (12’) cannot be satisﬁe d .O n c ea g a i n ,w ep r o c e e di n
steps to prove this:
Step 1. From Lemma 2 in BGM (p. 76) we know that too strong an incentive based on
the alternative-use value makes relational outsourcing inferior to spot employment, i.e., given
q1,p 1,q 2,p 2,∆Q there exists ∆β
0 such that, for any ∆b,i f∆β>∆β
0 then SRO − SSE < 0.
This result does not depend on the assumed bargaining scenario (see BGM for a proof).
Step 2.C h o o s e∆P0






,w h e r eSFB ≡ maxE [Q] −
c(a) stands for ﬁrst-best surplus. If ∆β>∆β





< 0, and the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the relational-
outsourcing contract to be self-enforcing, i.e., equation (12’), fails. If ∆β ≤ ∆β
0,o nt h e
other hand, we have that ∆P0
l > ∆β, so the second term on the left-hand side of the feasibil-
ity constraint (12’) is at least ∆P0


















, so once again the necessary and suﬃcient condition fails. There-
fore, we have that too large a variation in the alternative-use value makes relational out-
sourcing infeasible.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 1
Formally, we want to show that, for given values of q1,p 1,q 2,p 2,r,∆Q,i fAl holds and
∆P ∈ (0,P L) then there exists ∆P∗
l such that for all ∆P>∆P∗
l , D-ownership is more
eﬃcient than U-ownership. From Proposition 1 we know that there exists ∆Pl such that if
∆P>∆Pl then SSE >S SO
l , i.e., spot outsourcing is not eﬃcient. From Proposition 3 we
have that, for any ∆P>∆P0
l, relational outsourcing is not feasible. To complete the proof,
set ∆P∗
l =m a x{∆Pl,∆P0
l}.
28The upper bound on ∆P guarantees once again that assumption Al is not violated.
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